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Abstract 
In the information-based definition of knowledge, an agent is said to know 2 at a state .\ rf 7 
is true in all states that look the same as .F to that agent. However, m systems where an agent‘\ 
view of the system is partial, even if a state s’ may be logically indistinguishable from a state \. 
s’ may not be visible from s. For instance, in a distributed system, all global states in which the 
agent’s local state does not change look the same to that agent, but this set of global states ma) 
not be accessible because the agent may not even be aware of the existence of many agents m 
the network. We propose a logic of explicit knowledge built on agents’ views and show it to 
be decidable. @ 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
AMS clu.s.~jficarion: 03B45; 68QlO: 68T27 
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1. A distinction 
1.1. Basic hgic of knowledge 
During the last decade, there has been extensive research into the notion of ascrib- 
ing knowledge to reasoning agents, particularly in the contexts of distributed systems, 
artificial intelligence and mathematical economics. The book [I] provides an excellent 
summary of dominant themes in this line of research. 
Following Hintikka’s logical treatment [5], knowledge is studied as a modality in 
(typically) a propositional modal logic, with the semantics of formulas given in Kripke 
frames where the accessibility relation is an equivalence. Formally, we have a countable 
set of propositions P = { p0, p 1 . . . .} and the syntax of formulas is given by 
@ ::= ,17 E +xlz v /?lKsc 
’ This paper is a revised and expanded version of [17]. prepared in honour of Rohit Parthh. on Ill\ 60th 
birthday. 
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016%0072/99/S see front matter @ 1999 Elsevlcr Scwnce B.V. All rights resewed 
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The frames are Kripke structures F = (W, -), where W is a set of possible worlds, and 
N is an equivalence relation called the indistinguishability relation for the reasoning 
agent. Models are frames with valuations: M = (F, V), where F = ( W, -) and V: W 4 
2’. The semantics of formulas is then given by 
_ M,w+piff pE V(w). 
_ M,w 17~ iff A4,M: k a. 
-M,~:)=~~Vpiff(M,w~IorM,w~~). 
_ M,~/=K~~~~~~‘Nw,M,w’~=. 
The satisfiability and model checking problems for the logic are decidable, the set of 
valid formulas can be axiomatized [I]. 
1.2. Ascribed knowledge 
An assertion Ka in this logic can be read as: ‘the reasoning agent knows that the 
formula z holds’. What kind of knowledge is referred to here? There are (at least) two 
ways of interpreting this statement (see [6] for a related discussion): 
_ The agent possesses this knowledge in some actual sense; for instance, the agent 
can provide evidence in support of the assertion cz, or can answer some queries 
‘about’ CI. 
_ This is knowledge ascribed to the agent by an observer outside the system. The 
observer considers all the information available to the agent at the world state w and 
concludes that a is logically implied by such information, and therefore, can use the 
system as if the agent knew x. 
Clearly, the indistinguishability relation in the frames captures the notion of informa- 
tion in the latter sense (by describing the agent’s information partitions of the set of 
states), and thus the latter interpretation is more immediate. Limited as it may seem, 
this reading is still immensely useful, as we can meaningfully ascribe knowledge to 
thermostats, computer programs and other such entities in this manner (“the thermostat 
knows that the room is too warm, so it switches on the air conditioner”, “the program 
knows that the shared resource which is in use will be released within t units, so it 
decides to wait until then”, and so on). Such knowledge assertions can be useful in 
system verification. 
1.3. Limited uisibility 
This reading is not useful in situations where an agent in a system needs to compute 
its knowledge on the basis of evidence available to it. There is a way in which explicit 
knowledge differs from implicit knowledge, one which is especially important in the 
context of distributed computing. A reasoner operating in an environment has only a 
limited view of the world, and her explicit knowledge is determined by the visibility of 
world states to her, whereas ascribed implicit knowledge of the agent depends on her 
behaviour in all possible worlds. In terms of the indistinguishability relation - above, 
computing - in itself may necessitate some effort. We can conceive of a situation 
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where sg - sI N ~2, but at state so only SO and sI are visible to a computing agent 
and not ~2. That is, an observer who has access to complete information about all the 
world states may declare that the agent would behave in the same way in all these 
three states, but the agent itself may require computation to realise this. If the agent 
makes the effort and computes the world state s?, it may also realise that s: is in the 
same equivalence class as SI . 
Visibility can also seen as a manifestation of ~sourct~ houndedness: a resource lim- 
ited agent might need to reuse its resources, and thus computation rendering a state 
visible may entail losing information about other visible states making them no longer 
visible. Thus in the example above, as the agent computes the state ~2, it might ‘forget’ 
the information about so. 
Thus, even among states within the same externally ascribed indistinguishability 
class, some may be ‘farther’ and some ‘nearer’ in terms of visibility to an agent. In 
the context of distributed systems, this happens routinely. A component of a system 
behaves in the same manner in all yl~hal system states in which its focal state is the 
same. Hence, all these states would be ascribed in the same equivalence class for that 
agent. However, this component would typically communicate only with immediate 
neighbours in the network, and may not even be aware of the existence of many 
other ‘distant’ components in the network. In this case, for the agent to compute its 
knowledge, the first task of computing these indistinguishable system states is well 
beyond its capabilities. 
Moreover, at different system states, the agent may have different views, and this is 
also dependent on the computational resources available to the agent. For instance, a 
dynamic computational agent with bounded memory may forget events in the distant 
past. Even in static situations, computation may result in learning thereby enlarging 
visibility. This aspect of the distinction between ascribed and computed knowledge of 
view-limited reasoners seems to have been relatively less studied in the literature. 
1.4. Algorithmic knowledge 
In this context, we should mention one way in which implicit and explicit knowledge 
have been distinguished extensively in the literature, where again view limitations seem 
relevant. In the logic defined above, a reasoner knows every logical consequence of 
any fact she knows; further she knows all the valid formulas. Human reasoners simply 
do not exhibit such logical omniscience, and hence the logic above does not reflect 
reasoning about human knowledge. On the other hand, if we consider the reasoner 
above to be a computing agent, we come up with the problem of resource hoztnded~~ess. 
The agent has only limited computational resources at its disposal, and exploring all the 
logical consequences of an assumption is expensive business. In particular, the validity 
problem for the propositional calculus is already co-NP-complete, and for the reasoner 
to know all tautologies requires, at the least, a co-NP machine. See [l] for a detailed 
treatment of this issue. Clearly, explicit knowledge should be resource bounded. 
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The papers of Rohit Parikh [12], [13], [14] and [15] provide all manners of criticism 
which include the two observations above and much more. For instance, he discusses 
the distinction between knowledge and information; the distinction between knowledge 
of a proposition and knowledge of the sentence denoting the proposition, and so on. 
In some sense, all these can be seen as further refinements of the distinction between 
knowledge explicitly available to an agent and implicit knowledge ascribed to the agent. 
An algorithm-based notion of knowledge has been proposed in [l] (Chapter 10) and 
[12] to capture explicit knowledge. This works as follows: at any state s, when asked 
whether a formula 4 holds, the reasoner evokes an algorithm available at s. If the 
algorithm returns ‘Yes’, we say that the reasoner explicitly (or algorithmically) knows 
4. Depending on whether the algorithm gives only ‘Yes/No’ outputs or whether it also 
has the possibility of a ‘?’ output meaning ‘I cannot find out within the resources 
available to me’, we get the notions studied in [l] or [12], respectively. [l] restricts 
the algorithm to be local, in the sense that when s N s’, the algorithm invoked by the 
reasoner at s is the same as at s’. 
Unfortunately, the framework is also very general and it is hard to study properties 
of this notion of knowledge. How do we relate different algorithms used by different 
reasoners? When we iterate modalities to say that i knows that j knows that x holds, 
should i have access to j’s algorithm as well? If the system moves from a state s to 
state s’, how should the algorithms available at the two states be related? Further, the 
invocation of an algorithm is an extra-logical notion and as it is, we have no way of 
studying algorithmic knowledge logically. 
On the other hand, the algorithm-based formulation of explicit knowledge is inter- 
esting particularly because it avoids many of the philosophical pitfalls which cause 
criticism. One way of studying algorithmic knowledge logically is to decide that all 
reasoners uniformly use the same algorithm, namely the model checking algorithm for 
the logic. This means that when G( is valid, the reasoner knows x to be true but does 
not know that it is valid. This is because E, being a valid formula, happens also to 
be true in all the states being checked by the algorithm, and thus is explicitly known, 
but then so are many other non-valid formulas which simply happen to be true in the 
checked model. (See [4] for more general arguments advocating model checking rather 
than theorem proving in the context of reasoning about systems.) The framework fa- 
cilitates the study of knowledge based on probabilistic algorithms [S] and action based 
on knowledge [2, 161. This circumvents many of the difficulties mentioned above, but 
a requirement that all reasoners use the same knowledge algorithm seems too strong. It 
is here that a view-based notion of knowledge helps, whereby we can have a uniform 
logical notion of all reasoners invoking the same model checking algorithm, but they 
run the algorithm on different sub-models. 
1.5. This paper 
In this paper, we approach the problem by asking: if knowledge amounts to model 
checking, which model is to be checked? We hypothesize that due to limited visibility, 
the agent can see only a substructure of the given model, and hence checks for truth 
in that substructure. Thus, an agent claims that $ holds at a state if 4 holds in the 
substructure visible to the agent at that state. We can then say that the agent claims to 
know $J if 4 holds in the substructure at all the visible indistinguishable states. This 
gives a framework in which a form of algorithmic knowledge is studied logically. and 
which takes into account the limited visibility of agents. Thus, we have three basic 
notions: truth of a proposition, ascribed knowledge of propositions (determined by 
indistinguishability relations) and claimed knowledge (determined by views). The third 
notion is dependent on the agent’s view, and hence when the view changes, knowledge 
claimed by the agent changes as well. 
2. The logic 
We now present a logic of view-based explicit knowledge. This is simply the usual 
logic of knowledge augmented with a new modality: Xx will denote that the formula 
x holds explicitly (or visibly) for the reasoner. For explicit knowledge, WC will USC 
formulas of the form XKa. (As [l] observe in Chapter 10, this should be seen as a 
reasoner claiming to know s( rather than knowing 2.) 
2. I. SJWU,~ 
Formally. we have a countable set of propositions P = (~0, 121, . .} as before and 
the syntax of formulas is given by 
‘S’ ::= p t PI+ v flIKalXct 
The fixed formula po V 1~0 is called True. @, the set of formulas introduced earlier. is 
a subset of Y and formulas in @ are referred to as X-free formulas. The other logical 
connectives are defined as usual. The dual of Kz, namely -K-x, is denoted Lx. and 
the dual of Xr. namely ~XTE, is denoted YCY. 
2.2. Semarttit~s 
The frames are Kripke equivalence structures augmented with view functions 
Definition 1. A view ,fLame is a tuple F = (W, w, Y), where PV is a set of worlds, 
_ C W x IV’ is an equivalence on W, and v : W -- 2” is the view, ,futvtiotz. 
A model is a tuple A4 = (F. V), where F = (W. N, v) is a frame. and V: IV’ --+ 2” 
is the valuation. We denote the equivalence class of \\I under y by [n,]. 
When tt.’ E I+(Lv), we say that I.V’ is uisihfe from 1~. Note that there is no assumption 
that every world state is visible to the reasoner at that state. (Indeed, WC might well 
have am = 8 for some w.) A world M’ is said to be twogni-_ahle if IL’ c \I( 11’ ). A 
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frame F is said to be recognizable if every world in F is. While recognizability may 
be too strong an assumption to make about every world, it may seem unintuitive to 
have worlds w,w’ where w E v(w’) but w $ V(W). Thus, even if every world is not 
recognizable, we might at least want every visible world to be recognizable: call a 
frame F weakly recognizable iff for every +v, if there exists MJ’ such that w E v(w’) 
then MI E v(w). On the other hand, we will call a frame F almost recognizable iff for 
every VV, if V(W) # 0, then w E v(w). We will show that our logic cannot distinguish 
between general view models and those based on almost recognizable frames. 
The standard Kripke frames for knowledge can now be seen as view frames with 
constant universal view function: V~V, V(W) = W. 
When we have w - w’ and w’ # V(VV), we may wish to interpret this as w and PV’ 
being logically indistinguishable, but computationally distinguishable. (This happens 
in situations where discovering that i+! and w’ constitute the same evidence requires 
computation. )
Definition 2. Given a view frame F = (W, -J, v) and W’ C W, the restriction of F to 
W’ is given by F f W’ %f ( W', N’, v’), where -’ kf - n( W’ x W’) and VW E W’, 
v’(w) dg’ 11(w) n W’. For a model A4 = (F, V), we define M[W’ dAf (F [ W’, V’), where 
for I*’ E W’, V’(w) 2 V(w). 
The intended meaning of Xcc at w should be clear now: it simply asserts that CI holds 
in the substructure induced by v(w) at 1%‘. We assume that all other connectives have 
the same meanings as before. 
As usual, we say CI is satisfiable if there exists a view model A4 = ((W, -, v), V) 
such that for some w E W, we have A4, w /= x. In addition, we say c( is explicitly 
sati.$able if there exists a model A4 = ((IV, N, v), V) such that for some w E W, we 
have W = I*(W) and M. w b LY. A formula is (explicitly) valid if and only if its negation 
is not (explicitly) satisfiable. Note that c( is explicitly satisfiable iff Xa is satisfiable, 
and c( is explicitly valid iff Ya is valid. 
The first thing to note is that the modality does not collapse - in the sense that there 
are formulas u such that (x E Xcc is not valid. To see this, consider the view frame 
given by W = {w,, we}, N= W x W and v(~J/) = {w,} for j E {1,2}. Let M be a 
model on this frame with the valuation: V(wi) = 0 and V(w,) = {p}. Clearly, we see 
that M. wl + (Lp A lXLp), and that M, w2 + (1Kp A XKp). 
Secondly, consider the dual modality: YE is a weaker assertion - at w it only means 
that if 1~ E v(w) then M [~(w),w + a, and hence can be true vacuously. However, we 
can check that the implication Xx 3 Yx is valid and that the implication becomes an 
equivalence over models based on recognizable frames. 
Thirdly, though Xa 3 a is not valid, c1 z Xcc is explicitly valid, as we would expect. 
Further, the equivalences XXa z Xx z XYa and YXc( E Ycc E YYa are valid. Thus 
we have a modality which is not like a traditional S5 modality and somewhat different 
from a usual belief modality. To see this, note that Ka 2 z and -Kcr K~KY are 
valid formulas, but Xsc I x and 7x3 2 X-XY arc not. But X1Xr X-,x is valid. 
but such an assertion is not defensible if we interpret X as a belief modality, since an 
agent may not believe that r holds and be aware of such a belief, but may ycl not 
believe that the denial of c( holds either. 
Like the K and L modalities, the X and Y modalities also collapse at the second 
level. We get nontrivial second level modalities only by looking at (I~~P/~~MT~o~~s 01‘ 
the knowledge and explicitness modalities like XK, XL, etc. Indeed. a formula like 
XLXLXKy may not in general be collapsible to any smaller formula. Therefore, WC 
will be interested in the modal alternation depth of a formula, which ~111 bc 
formally defined later. 
?. 3. Suh.stvuc~tul~es 
How do we determine the s&e of a finite view frame? This is important, for questiotls 
like mo&l ckeckiny, where we are given a view model M, an element 11‘ in .V and 
a formula x, and asked whether A4, M* /= r. When this is a decidable problem, wc 
are interested in the complexity of the decision procedure in terms of the input size. 
namely the size of M and the length of r. For a finite frame F = (IV, -, 1'). we might 
think of 1Wl as the size of F, but this can really be misleading. 
Consider a structure W = {IQ, IVY,. . .}, where for all j, \‘( it’, ) = { LV,. IL’, , } and some 
model M based on it. Then for any modal formula 2, the truth of z at it’! (,j ;, 0) 
in the structure M [v(w,) is in general independent of the truth of the same formula at 
the same state in the structure M [v(N~,_ I ). 
Thus, for any formula x and worlds ~7~) ‘1 such that 11’2 E L’( 1~1 ), we need to see 
whether M [V(VVI ).IV? + E holds. But there is still worse to come: when this formula r 
is of the form X/I, this requires us to look at the substructure obtained by restricting 
to (v(\v, ) P I’) which need not be of the form v(M.) for any >I’ E n/. Therefore. m 
the worst cast, we should be prepared to look at A4 YS. ~1‘ + r for arbitrary nonempt> 
subsets S of W (such that )V E S). This makes the logic hard to decide. 
Can we find formulas that force us to look at substructures in the manner described 
above? For instance, consider the frame F = (IV, -. I'), where CZ’ = ( ~I’I. I~‘J. IL’:. II’~). 
-= W x PP’. and v is given by v(vL’,) = {I~‘~,~~.u~~}, V(IV~) = {I~.~.\\.;,\~.~}. \*(rl-!) : 
-(wJ~. IL.-,,~v~} and V(VV~) = {bid}. Consider the valuation P’(br.3) = { r~}* and for all 
IZ‘ # VV~. I’(w) = 0. Let 6 = XLXLXKp. It can be checked that M. 11 1 r-- O, and 
for any proper modal suffix 6’ of 6, for all II’ E CZ’, M, 11‘ p 8. Evaluating this 
formula at ~‘1 requires evaluation of suRixes LXLXKp at Ml = M /v(~t~~ ). LXKp at 
,M,’ = Ml [v(w, ),j E {2,3} and XKp at M3 = M$ [V(IV; ), respectively. 
in general, given a frame F = (W, -. v), where /WI = n, there may bc as many as 
O(n”) substructures of interest for checking truth of a formula. This crucially depends 
on how nasty the view function Y of the frame happens to be, as well as the modal 
alternation depth of the formula to be checked. For formulas, we have already pointed 
350 R. Ramam4jaml Annals qf Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1999) 343-368 
out that modal alternation depth is a parameter of interest. Similarly, the depth to which 
we need to look at substructures of substructures matters as well. Formally, we have 
the following: 
Definition 3. Let F = (W, -, v) be a frame. A view tree of depth d on F is a labelled 
tree TF = (0, +. 1”) of depth d, where 0 is the set of tree nodes with the distinguished 
element (30 as the root, -+ C(O x W x 0) is the set of edges labelled by elements 
of W, and i : 0 + 2”’ labels each node by a subset of W, satisfying the following 
conditions: 
(i) A(&) = W. 
(ii) If there are tree edges &%’ and 8%“, then t)’ = 19”. 
(iii) If 19%’ then w E 3,(W) = (>(Q) n v(w)) # A(t3). 
(iv) If U is a node of depth k < d and w E (i(O) n V(W)) # i(O), then there exists a 
tree edge 0x0’. 
Condition (iii) is referred to as a coherence condition; we will see a need to weaken 
this condition in the next section. 
If F = (W, N, v) is a frame, it induces a view tree on F: the root is labelled W, and 
whenever there is a node labelled S and w r (S n v(w)) # S, there exists an edge to 
a node labelled 5’ n v(w). All view trees upto a specific depth on the same frame are 
isomorphic, so we can speak of the d depth view tree associated with a frame. 
3. Decidability 
For convenience, we assume from now on that the constant True E Y. Before we 
proceed to look for decision procedures for satisfiability for this logic, some observa- 
tions simplifying the problem can be made. In any structure F = ( W, -, v), when we 
are interested in satisfying a given formula at a world wg E W, we can simply restrict 
ourselves to the substructure induced by the equivalence class of ~0 under N. For 
logics of knowledge where there is only one knower, the accessibility relation may as 
well be universal. In fact, this observation is used to show that satisfiability is in NP. 
It is no surprise that such universal models suffice for this logic as well. 
Definition 4. A view frame F = (W, -, 11) is called a universal view frame iff 
-=wxw. 
Proposition 5. If ct is sati$able, then it is satisjiable in a universal model. 
Proof. Given a formula CIO satisfied at wo in model A4 = ((W, -, v), V), define the new 
model M’ = M[[wa]. Note that M’ has the structure M’ = ((W’, N’, v’), V’), where 
W’ = [wo]_. Thus for any w N wa, w E W’ and w _’ wa, and M’ is a model based 
on a universal frame. 
We now show by induction (on the structure of x) that, for all x, HIL. E [it.,,]. the 
following statement holds: 
- V’s i W such that IV E S, M[.S,ti’ + Y if and only if M’/(S r~ [ivoJ).n* F ZC. 
The cases when a is a boolean formula are routine. Let S 2 W and ~2: E (5 fr ]w,o] ). 
Suppose M[S.\C b Kfl, then (V’rr,’ E S, if IL‘ b it” then ,Vl [S, ii.’ ~= /r’). Now II‘ t 1 l~,(~]. 
hence H.’ t [n.(,], and by induction hypothesis, M’[(S I- [IV,,] I, ii” k p. Since this holds 
for all ~3’ _’ ir, we have M’[(S n [bt.,)]).~. /= K/l, as required. The other direction IS 
similar. 
Now suppose r is of the form X/j and that M [S,n’ j= X/i. Hence n’ E v(K~) and 
M [A+‘, ii’ b p, where S’ = S n r(n)). We then have it’ E S’ as well, and by induction 
hypothesis, M [(Yn[wa]),bt’ /== 0. Now, S’ri[~~,,] = (snr( ~~,))n[~~~] = (sn[i%,,,])?r(it,). 
and M’ E i+(n,). Therefore, M’[(S n [WC,]), )I’ + X/i’. as required. The other direction is 
again similar. 
This completes the induction. Now, putting S = bV. since M, K’(~ + 10. WC get 
M’ i[%,], nY1 k x0. But M’[[no] = M’. Thus, XI) is satisfiable in the universal model .M’. 
Proof. Suppose that M = ((W, -, v), V) is a model and WC, E IV such that A!, LL’() b- xi]. 
Define M’ = (( PV, w, r’), V), where v’ is defined as follows: if IL‘ E \(Lv), then v’( 1i.j = 
r( bv), and otherwise, v’(w) = 8. Note that the view tree T,. of any depth ~1’ is absolutely 
identical to the view tree r~/ of the same depth. WC can then easily show that for any 
node 0 in this (same) tree and LV E S = A(0), A4 [S. lt’ + x iff .M’ [S, it’ b 3, for any 
formula 9. In particular, this holds for it‘!, E 14’ : ;(#I) and Q. Thus. r(, is satislied 
in the almost recognizable model M’. 
In universal frames, we can simply drop the indistinguishability relation rr and work 
with only the view function v. Unfortunately, the logic is still hard to analyse. In the 
examples considered earlier, the frames were all universal. and yet we needed to look 
at substructures. However, we will show that the logic enjoys a hounded psctrdo-mode/ 
pwprrt~‘, so that we can limit the size of W’ when WC search for models for any given 
formula. This bound will depend on the modal alternation depth of a formula. defined 
as follows: 
Definition 7. The modal alternation depth of a formula J, denoted /l(r) is defined as 
follows: 
-. LL( p) ‘2. 0 for p E P. 
-. ,LL(lX) E p(a). 
-- /L(x V /I) d&T max {,@),~(/3)). 
- ~(Kcc) ‘!Z! /L(E). 
-. ,u(Xa) is defined inductively: 
l p(Xp) = 0 for p E P, 
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l /4x+> dc’ Gw, 
l &WI V 82)) dz max{AXh ), p(XP2)}, 
l /GKP) d”f P(B) + 1, 
0 p(XXP) d’f p(Xj3). 
Note that for any CI, ,U(CZ) d /~(Xct) 6 p(-x) + 1. The following proposition suggests 
how p proves useful. 
Proposition 8. Let F = (W,-, v) be a jiame and 5~ = (0, -+,ib) be a view tree on 
F. Let M = (F, V), 0 E 0, S = i(Q), w E (S n v(w)) and Xcc a formula such that 
,u(Xz) = p(a). Then M[S,w b Xz @ M[S,w b E. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on x. When z = p E P, the assertion follows from 
the fact that V [S = V [(S n v(w)). The boolean cases follow from the validity of 
identities X7/3 E (XTrue A -X/Q and X(8, v /&) z (Xpi V Xj?,). x cannot be of the 
form Kj? since ,u(XK/?) # ,u(p). If CI is of the form X/3, the assertion follows from the 
validity of the identity XX/? = X/3. 
Definition 9. The subformula closure of a formula ~1, denoted SF(a) is defined in 
the usual manner: SF’(a) is the least set containing c( and satisfying the following 
conditions - if Op /? E SF’(a) then p E SF’(a), where Op E { 7, K, X}; if j?, v /I2 E 
SF’(a) then {pi,/&} CSF’(cl); XTrue E SF’(@). We then define SF(x) sf SF’(u) U 
1-B I P E sF’(cO). 
Note that the size of SF(N) is linear in the length of u, when we treat Al/? to be 
the same as /?. Note that for every /3 E SF(Q), ,u(~)<p(cq~). 
3.1. Checking truth 
We first consider the following problem: given a finite view model M, a world w 
in it, and a formula M, is it the case that A4,w + a? 
Theorem 10. Given a,finite model M = (F, V) where F = ( W, N, v), 1 WI = n, wo E W, 
and a formula a() of length m, checking whether M, wo + CIO holds can be done in 
time O(nd+’ m), where d = p(q). 
Proof. Assume M, wo and MO as in the statement of the theorem. Assume a presentation 
of F such that for any wr,wz, checking “1 E v(w*)? or for a proposition p, checking 
p E V(wl)? is efficient. Let r~ = (0, +,;l) be the associated view tree of depth d; 
note that 101 = N = O(n”). Fix an enumeration of 0, say O,,&,. . ., fl,~ such that 
depth k nodes precede depth k - 1 nodes in the enumeration. Fix an enumeration of 
SF(ao) (hereafter referred to as SF for the rest of this proof) to be yi ,712,. . . , ym such 
that if y, precedes y,, in the enumeration, then either (p(yi) < ~(y,, )), or (y(yi) = 
,u(;I,) and 17, / f /y, I). Consider the lexicographic ordering on pairs (0,~) defined by the 
enumeration of nodes in TF and formulas in SF. 
We describe a labeling algorithm, that labels every pair (0. $1.). where 0 t 0 and 11’ E 
R(H) with L( 0, w) C SF. Initially, all the L( V. w) are empty and we consider a formula 
for adding as follows: xl is considered for L((1i,~~~ ) earlier than XL for L(&.M’~) ill’ 
(0, , ~1) precedes (t),, x2 ) in the lexicographic ordering. 
~ Add p E P to L(0.w) iff p E V(w) independent of 0. 
- Add 7~ to L(f1. IV) iff a +Z L(0. LV). 
._ Add Xa to L( 8, w) iff )V E I and 
l fl is a leaf node of ~1: and M E L( (I, M’) or, 
l 2 E L(0’. \v), where U%9’ is an edge in r/-. 
Finally, the algorithm terminates saying ‘Yes’ if ~1, E L( K’, in and ‘No’ otherwise. A 
straightforward inductive argument establishes that for all (1 E 0 and 1~ E i.(N) :- S. 
and for every formula ;’ E SF such that /L(Y) <P(Q) - &pth(H). 
;’ E L( (1. ~1) iff M [S, 1~’ + ;‘. 
In the only interesting case of the induction step when ;’ is of the form Xx, note that 
(1 is a leaf node of rF iff depth of 8 is d or for every 1~ E S = ;.((I), if tz’ t v(~v) then 
S = v(\v). In the former case, ~(7) = 0, then /[(Xx) = /L(Y), hence by Proposition 8, 
M[S,VV + Xr iff M[S,+r + M, and the induction hypothesis gives the required assertion. 
In the latter case, S I- r(ua) = S, hence M(S, u’ + Xx iff A4 [.S. $1‘ + r iff (by induction 
hypothesis) M E L(Q,~v) iff (by construction) Xsc E L((I, ~rl). The case when S is not a 
leaf node also follows easily from the induction hypothesis and the construction. 
Thus M,M’(~ + 30 iff a0 E L(&, WO), since M[W = M. thus establishing the correct- 
ness of the algorithm. It can be easily seen that the running time is O(n”nm), since 
the required checking at each node takes O(nm) time. 
3.2. Sutisfirrhilit?~ 
Fix a formula 30 and let SF denote SF(q). This is the formula whose satisfiability 
we will be concerned with: 
Definition 11. We say A C SF is em atone iff it satisfies the following conditions: 
- V’~ESF, ~/{EA iff /?#A. 
_ Vfll V /j: E SF, fly V pz t A iff /jl E A or /& E A. 
.- ‘v’K/j E SF, if K/l E A, then j3 E A. 
- If there is a formula X/3 E A then XTj.ue t A. 
_ For every X/3 E SF such that ,~(Xfi ) = p(/?), X/I’ E A iff p E A. 
Let AT denote the set of all atoms contained in SF, and use A, B,. . to denote 
atoms. We say A N B iff for every formula of the form Ku. KY t A ifl Kr E B. 
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(Though we use the same symbol - for the equivalence relation on frames as well as 
for this relation, the usage will be clear from the context.) We say A < B iff for every 
Xz E SF, LY E A iff Xa E B. 
Let Q & 2”T. We call Q a yood set iff for every A.B E Q, A N B, and if L/3 E A 
then for some C E Q, j? E C. We say that Q is good for x if Q is good and there 
exists A E Q such that a E A. 
Proposition 12. An X-free jbrmulu c( E SF is satkjiable $fAT contains a subset which 
is good for c(. 
Proof. For any formula a, if it is satisfiable, let M = ((W, N, v), V) and vv E W such 
that A4,w b a(. Consider the set {,a(n~‘)In~ N w}, where /l(~i’) = {fl E SFIM,w’ /= /I}. 
It is easy to see that each element of the set is an atom and that the set is good. 
On the other hand, let a E SF be X-free and let Q CAT be good with A E Q, 
CI in A. Define the frame F = (Q, -, v), where for all B E Q, v(B) = Q. Define 
Y(B) = B n P. This gives a model M and by an easy induction on the structure of y, 
we can show that for any B E Q, Al, B + y iff y E B. We thus get M, A /== a, hence c( is 
satisfiable. 
We now come to the main construction for checking satisfiability. The idea is (as 
usual) to build a finite model for any satisfiable formula c(, in such a way that the 
size of the model is bounded by a function of Ial. If this finite model is constructed 
in some canonical fashion, then checking for satisfiability amounts to an attempt at 
building this model; the attempt succeeds iff the formula is satisfiable. As it turns out, 
we will work with structures (called witness structures below) that do not quite define 
models, but act as pseudo-models from which we can pull out models. 
Given ~0, we try to construct a model ((W, -, v), V). If ~(0 was X-free, we only need 
a subset Q of AT which is good for cca; then we can set -= (Q x Q) and v(w) = Q 
for all M? E Q. The idea is that c( E vv represents the fact that M holds at w in the 
constructed model. When we have X-formulas in SF, a formula like Lp A XK-p is 
satisfiable, and it becomes necessary to have v(w) # Q. This creates a new problem: 
suppose w’ t v(w) 2 Q: different formulas are satisfied at PV’ in the model M being 
constructed and in M[v(w). Hence we cannot simply use sets of formulas as elements 
of Q. We need to build a view tree based on Q and for each node 0 in the tree, 
we need a good subset such that c( t VV’ E S = i(I)) represents the truth of c( at w’ 
in M[S. 
A partial view tree (of depth d) on F = (W, -, v) is a labelled tree 7,~ similar to a 
view tree, except that instead of the coherence condition, it satisfies a weaker condition: 
_ If 8%’ then either (0 = Bo and j(0’) = v(w) # W) or 
(w E 1”(0’) C(&B) n v(w)) # n(e)). 
Note that every view tree on a frame is a partial view tree on that frame as well. Also, 
nodes at depth 1 in partial view trees exactly specify v, as in view trees. Thus, for 
w E W such that w E V(W), either v(w) = W = l,(&), or there is a depth 1 node 8, 
in T with ;((I,,.) = V(W). We use the notation Q. for the root. fl,, for this node (00 or 
a unique depth 1 node), T[$L~ to denote the subtree of r rooted at {I,,,, and 0 111, for the 
set of nodes in this subtree. 
When 5~. is a partial view tree on F of depth d, we say that z/.. has a (0. I(,’ ) 
requirement at M’ iff the node 0 is in rp-[~v. depth of 0 is k < d and there IS an 
edge 0%’ such that (i.(Q)n ~(tv’)) # ;-(0’). Clearly, a partial view tree of depth d on 
a frame F is a view tree on F iff it has no requirements at any II‘ in it. 
Definition 13. Let F = (W, -. V) be a frame, and let T/ = (0. +, PL) bc a partial view 
tree on F of depth d = ~(cco). A M,itness .stntcture on F for x0 based on rl is a 
map T: (0 x IV) + AT, defined for all pairs ((I, n,) such that 11’ E j.(f)), satisfying the 
following conditions: 
(i) For e\‘ery 0 t 0 and II’ t i.(O). the following conditions hold: 
(a) T(II.\rs)rlP = T(O,J,IV)~IP. 
(b) XTme E T(O,br) iff 1,~ E Y(PV). 
(c) { T(I), \v’)/\L’ E l.(O)} is a good set. 
(d) If 11’ E ~(bij) then either (T(H,tv) < T(O,IV)) or there is an edge 010’ such 
that T( (7, R:) < T( 0. M.). 
(ii) There exists \L’(J E W such that czo E T(fl+ 1~~)). 
When T is a witness structure on a frame F based on z/c and TF has a requirement. 
then we usually also say that T has that requirement in F, and call T a partiol ItYtncxv 
stvucturc in this case. Clearly, a witness structure T based on a \/icw tree has no 
requirements. and in that case, we call T a complete n!itncs.y structure. 
Let T be a complete witness structure for ‘x0 on F. Define the model n/l, = (F. k~, ). 
where V, (1,~‘) = T(f)“, IV) n P. The following lemma shows that MI. w. + xc,. since 
MT[(>.(n,,,, = Ml_. 
Lemma 14. Let F = (W,--, 11) he a ,fmme, let ~1 = (0. i. 2) he N Celt’ tm’ m I- 
of’ depth d = ~(CCO) und let T: (0 x W) + AT he a comnplete ktness .structurc otz 
F based on IF. Then ,ftir ever!, 8 E 0 md IV t S = 2(O). ,for every’ ,fbmulrr Y c SF 
.wch that p(x) <(d - depth(U)), cx E T(O.IV) {j’M,-/S, MI I= x. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of x. When x = p E P, p E T( lI.lt’) 
iff p E V(~V) iff M, IV b p iff MIS. 1~ /= p since V(U-) = (V [S)(IL.). for 1~ E 5’. The 
cases when Y is boolean are routine. 
Now suppose that Kx E T(Q. bv). To show that A4 IS. 1%’ b KM. consider $1” E (S,l[~i,] ): 
it suffices to show that M[S, PV’ + 2, which would follow by the induction hypothesis 
if x E T( 0. +v’). But T( 0. wg) - T(0. I(.’ ); hence Ka t T(H. 1~“) and since T( 0. it.’ ) is an 
atom, x E ‘T(O, K”), as required. 
Conversely, if M [S. M‘ b Kr and Kx $ T(fl,*v), we have Lla t T( 0. w’) i: SF. 
By condition I(c) on witness structures and definition of a good subset of AT. there 
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exists W’ E (A(0) n [w]) such that la E T(B,w’). Hence c( @ T(tl,~‘). By induc- 
tion hypothesis, M[S, W’ k ‘x, contradicting the fact that M[S, w k KM, and we 
are done. 
Now let Xcc E T(t), w). Then XTvue E T(t), W) and by condition l(b) on witness 
structures, w E v(w). Let S’ = (S n v(w)). If S’ = S, then there exists no edge 
labelled w out of 0, and by condition l(d) on witness structures, T(O, w) =$ T( N, w), 
hence c( E r(0,w). By induction hypothesis, M[S, w + c(. But S = (S fl V(W)), hence 
W(S n v(w)), w /= c[, so M[S, w + Xcl, as required. On the other hand, if S’ # S, 
we have two cases: either depth(B) = d, or there exists an edge 0%‘. In the latter 
case, by condition l(d), T( 8, w’) < T( 0, w), and hence M E T(U’, w). Since 3.(f)‘) = 
(S f’ v(w)), by induction hypothesis we get A4 [(S n v(w)), w /== a, and again, A4 [S, w /= 
Xa, as required. When depth(8) = d, p(Xx) = 0 = p(a) and since T(U,w) is an 
atom, 31 E T(8, w). By induction hypothesis, A4 IS, w /= r. But then, by Proposition 8, 
A4 IS, w + Xx, as required. 
On the other hand, when MIS, u’ + Xx, then we can proceed in a similar manner 
to show that Xx E T(U, w). 
Thus, if we can build a view tree and a (complete) witness structure for a formula 
on it, then that formula is satisfiable. On the other hand, whenever we are given a 
model for a formula, we can build a partial view tree on a frame of bounded size and 
a (partial) witness structure for that formula on it. 
Lemma 15. Zf ~~ is satisfiable, then there e.uists a jinite jiame F = (W, N, v) and 
a partial witness structure ,jOr ~(0 on F such thut /WI <201”“‘), where m = lcxo\ and 
d = P(~o). 
Proof. Suppose that ~(0 is satisfiable. By Proposition 5, we may assume that it is 
satisfied in a universal model. Let A4 = (F, V) be the given model where F = (W, $9) is 
a universal frame, and for some wo E W, M, wo b a~. Let d = AL. By Proposition 6, 
we can also assume that for all w E W, if V(W) # 0, then w E V(W). 
Let Z,G = (0, +, 1,) denote the view tree associated with F of depth d. Consider the 
map T : (@ x W) --f 2 AT defined by T(O,w) def {y E SF/MrA(U),w /= y}. It is easy 
to check that for all 0 E 0 and w E 1(H), T(U, w) is an atom, and that T is a witness 
structure on ZF. However, T is not the witness structure required to prove the lemma, 
as W may be infinite. 
Consider the following equivalence relation on W: w z ~1,’ iff for all 0 E 0 such 
that depth( 0) d d and {w, w’} C j_(O), T(0, w) = T( 0, w’). In particular, when ~1 E ~2, 
T(&,wl ) = T(Qo, w2), and hence V(W, ) n SF = V(w2) n SF. G gives us a quotiented 
structure. (Below, we use the notation [w] to denote equivalence classes under z-; 
since we have dispensed with the use of -, this should cause no confusion.) For- 
-- 
mally, a dAf (F, V), where F = (W,V) is defined as follows: w dg { [w]Iw E W} 
and V([w]) def {[w’]lw’ E V(W)}. v([w]) dg V(w) n SF. Note that [w] E V([w]) iff 
w E v(w), thanks to the assumption on the given model, that for any w’, if w’ @ v(w’) 
then v(\v’) = v). Since the size of AT is 2’)‘“‘), where m = iz,J, it is easy to check that 
IFi <20(““/)_ 
For JV’ C II’. let 8” denote the set {[IL.‘]/)\,’ E IV’}. Whcnevcr ltl, C M’? (1: IZ’. wc 
have WI C IV? C IV as well. 
Let 0 bc a node in 51.. and let S C i(0). If ~1% C-(S i I I’( 1~‘)). it is easy to set that 
SCIU( [IV]) & S ‘7 \‘(n*), though not necessarily the other way around. This is because. ~1.c 
can have 11’1 t (S - \‘(~t’)) and IL’? E (Y(I,~,) - S) such that 11’~ YE )v?. and hence 111,~ j 
_~~ 
[\L,?] I= .Y c (Sf~l’(w)), but there need be no :c’ E (.SZ$I~‘)) such that [it.‘1 - v Thus. 
in cffcct. when WC ‘quotient’ ~b,. we get a partial c’icw tree. CZ’e make this prccisc nav.. 
Construct the tree r = (il, a,?) and a map (/I: 1 -- 0 defined as follows: >.( j,, ) = 
IV and 4( L,, ) = 00, where (50 is the root. Inducti\cly assume that WC have: a node (j 
of depth k < d such that $(6) = 0, .Y = >(,i) = S, where S -= i.(O). Now. suppose 
there exists an edge (1°C in r/,, but there is no cdgc labellcd IMP] out of 0. We ha1.c 
l1r.1 c (X 11 T( [\L.] )). Add a node 8 in 3. and an edge &G’. with i( ci’ ) =~ , (0’ ). Set 
<b(X) = 0:. 
WC claim that i is a partial view tree on the frame F. It is easy to XC that the lirst 
three conditions defining partial view trees arc satisfied. Now. suppose tha[ UC ha\c :I 
node ci of depth ii < d and .r E (X TI i(v) j f .Y, where x’ - L( 6). WC need to shou 
that there is an edge labelled I out of ci in 5. Let (/I( (5) = 0. It suffices to show thar 
there exists an edge O!!+O’ in T/,, where .Y = [IV] and it ; S, by construction. Suppose 
there exists no such edge in zf . Note that IL E V(IV ) since .\- E Kt-). We ha\ c S ‘& I( it’ 1. 
and hence :? C V( \ra) = v([>v]). But X = 3, and we get .\’ 12 ?(.Y). contradicting out 
assumption that (X !? l’(X)) 7_’ X. This establishes our claim. 
Define ir: (-1 x W ) - 2 ” as follows: let 6 E 1 and .t 6 i( ii). Let $( ,i) = (I and 
S = X(0). Then there exists it’ t S such that Y = [I\,]. Define ?‘(ii. v) ‘2 T(I). LI-). Thih 
is well-defined. because for all 11,’ E S such that t- r~ [II,‘], T( 0. LVI = T(rl. 11,’ I_ bk 
definition of z. 
WC now claim that T is a witness structure on F for go based on the partial vic\b tree 
t. This is proved easily: observe that when the set { T( 0. ri,)l~ E i(O)} i< good. then 
w is the set jr(c). [IV])~[IC] E ?(8)} when 4((j) = 0. Further. when thcrc is an cdgc 
C-0’ in 7, , WC get an edge #$S’ correspondingly in ? and T(8’. [\I,] ) :: TC 0’. ii I z 
T( II. 1~) = Tt ci. [WI ). 
WC thus have a witness structure for ~0 of hounded size on a partiai view [rec. 
proving the Icmma. 
WC next show that whenever we have a partial witness structure T for x!, on a finltc 
frame F. we can extend it to a (possibly infinite) frame F’ with a complete witness 
slructurc T’ on it. Once we show this. Lemmas 14 and 15 then imply that :I formula 
is satisfiable iff there exists a partial witness structure for it on a bounded size frame. 
To prove this. we first need to make the notion of ‘extending’ frames prcclse. 
Let T be a partial witness structure on a frame F = (IV. L’) and T/ = (0, --. L j. a 
partial view tree associated with it. Let T’ be a partial wltncss structure on frame 1.“ 
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where F’ = (W’, v’) and t,C’ = (@‘, +‘,/2’) is a partial view tree associated with F’ 
such that WC W’. Let w E W such that v(w) = v’(w). We say that T’ extends T at 
w iff T(&, w) = T’(tz$, w) and if w E v(w), then Z,L- [w is isomorphic to rF’ [w, given 
by a bijection f: 0 [w --+ 0’ [w such that for all 8 E 0 [w, n(O) = i’(.f(O)), and for 
all w’ E n(O), T(t3,w’) = T’(f(Q,w’). 
We now show how to extend partial view trees to view trees. The strategy is to 
pick one w, fulfill all requirements at w and then move to the next. A requirement 
in a partial view tree is typically an edge Q%V, in the subtree rooted at &, where 
S = (/2(O) n v(w’)) - 3”(V) # 0. L e wI E S. We extend the frame to a larger one t 
by adding a new element w2 and replacing v(w’) by (v(w’) - {WI}) U {we} in the 
new frame. If we do this for every element in S, in the resulting frame, this particular 
requirement does not exist. This construction is repeated at all levels in the subtree 
rooted at w, giving a new structure without any requirements at w. 
Suppose that we have fulfilled all wl-requirements. Then how can we be sure that 
while fulfilling some w2-requirement, we will not generate new wt-requirements? Note 
that in the construction suggested above, while fulfilling requirements at w, a new 
requirement may be generated for w’ only if w’ E v(w). Therefore, once we fulfill all 
WI-requirements, if we have that WI # v(wz) for any w2 that may be considered later, 
we can ensure that no new WI-requirements will arise. 
The following proposition asserts that we can always “relabel” elements in a frame 
and retain a partial witness structure in such a way that a designated world w is not 
visible from any other world in the resulting frame, except possibly from itself. 
Proposition 16. Given a partial witness structure T on a ,jinite frame F = (W, -, v), 
and w E W, there exists a partial witness structure T’ on a frame F’ = ( W', -‘, v’) 
such that W S W’, v(w) = v’(w), for all w’ E ( W’ - {w}), w .$ v’(w’) and T’ extends 
T at w. 
Proof. Fix w and let w’ # w such that w E v(w’). Pick x @ W and set W’ = W U {x}. 
Define v’(n) = 8 if v(w) is empty, and otherwise let v’(x) = (v(w) - {w}) U {x}. For 
w” E W - {w}, if w E v(w”) then define v’(w”) = (v(w”) - {w}) U {x}; otherwise set 
v’(w”) = v(w”). Define N’=N U{(x,x)} U {(x, w”),(w”,x)lw N w”}. 
We need to define T’: construct r,C’ = (O’, -+‘, n’) as follows. The root 0; is labelled 
W’. Define T’(O&w”) = T(&,w”) for w” E W and T/(0&x) = T(&,w). Let 19; E 0’. 
Then there exists 191 E 0 such that n(Oi) = 1’($) or n’(O{) = (3.(Oi) - {w}) U {x}. 
Suppose there is an edge %i!%$ in zF. Then add an edge 0~~0~ where the label 
y = w” if w” # w, and the label is y = x, otherwise. Set A’(($) = 46$) or A’($) = 
(A(&) - {w}) U {x}, depending on the corresponding case with Or. Set T’(&, w’) = 
T(&,w’) if w’ E W and T’(&,x) = T(&,w), otherwise. 
It can be checked that T’ is a partial witness structure on F’ as required. 
Lemma 17. Given a partial witness tructure T on a jinite universal frame F = ( W, v) 
and w E W such that T has some requirements at w, there exists a partial witness 
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structure T’ on u jinite universal Jramr F’ = (W’, v’) such that W C_ W’, jtir all M.’ t 
( W - v(w)) u {w}, v’(d) = v(d), T’ extends T ut M.‘, and T’ hus no requirements 
ut w. 
Proof. Suppose that T has some requirements at 2. Fix an enumeration of nodes 
in 71; [s such that nodes at depth k precede nodes at depth k + 1. Let (01, sir ), . ., 
(t),,,,w,,) be an enumeration of requirements at i?. We define a sequence of frames 
FI,, FI, . . . , F ,,,, where F, = (Wi, v,) and maps To, TI.. . . , Tj such that for 1 <j <m, for 
every )L.’ E (W-v(w))U{w}, v,;(d) = \lj-l(W’), Ti extends T,_, at VV’ via the bijection 
,f’i and there is no (fi(Oi),wj) requirement at w in Fi. 
Define Fo by WC) = W, vo = 11 and To = T. Given Fj_1 and T,_l, ,j > 0, check 
if there is a (U,, ~1~) requirement at $ in F/-I. If there is no such requirement, set 
F, = F,_, and T, = T;_l, with f, being the identity map. Otherwise, consider the 
edge O,%I’ in F,_l and the set S = (E~j_-~(0,) n v-[(wj)) - Aj_l(d’). Since this is 
a requirement. S # 0. Let S = {UI, . . . , IA/;}. Pick a set X = {x1,. ,.q} such that 
X n W,_, = 0, and define g : S + X by g(u,) = x,, for I<idk. Define Fi by 
W, = W,_, UX;, and Vi is defined as follows: let S’ = v(w) - {IV}; for VV’ E (W-S’), 
define v~(u~‘) = r-1(““); for w’ E S’, define v,(Iu’) = (v_-~(w’) - S) U {g(u,)lu, E 
(Snv,_,(w’))}. F or M?’ E X, define vi(x,) = (~Jj-I(u,)-S)U{g(u,)lui E (Snv..I(u,))}. 
Now consider r,, and a map 4: 0, + @,_I defined in the obvious manner: the 
root 06 is labelled W, and 4(0;) = ICI{-- ‘. For all LV’ E W,_, , if pi’ E V(U” ), r, 
contains a subtree isomorphic to ?,__I [IV’ with labels changed as follows: given a node 
0’ in r, [IV’ whose image is d-i-.’ in T,_ I) if A,_,(oi-‘) = R, and R n S’ = 0, then 
A,(H/) = R: in this case, set T,(OJ,w’) = T,_,(H’-‘,+I.‘), for >v’ E R. Otherwise, 
i.,(H’) = (R ~ S) U {g(u,)lu, E ,i-,(Olp’)}. Then set T,(fI’,w’) = T,_~(Ol~‘,ws’), 
for w’ E (R - S), and set T,(dj.xt) = T,_l(O’-‘,ur). For x, such that Xi E v~(x,), Z, 
contains a subtree isomorphic to z,-I [u,, with labels changed and T, extended again 
exactly as above. It is easy to see that Tj is a partial witness structure on F, based on 
r,, satisfying the inductive conditions, as required. 
The construction gives the required partial witness structure T,,, on F,,, with no 
requirements at 11’. 
Lemma 18. [f‘ ~(0 has a partial witness structure T on a jinite universal jrume F = 
(W, V) such that C.Q E T(%o, WO) for some wo E W, then there exists a complete witness 
structure T’ ,jOr ~0 on a universal jirame F’ such that T’ extends T at wo. 
Proof. Fix T, F = (W, v), wo E W and rF as above. Fix a countable set U = W U 
{uo, ~1,. .} such that for all j, ui @ W, and an enumeration of U such that elements 
of W precede elements in U - W in the enumeration. We now define a sequence of 
finite universal frames Fcj, FI, . . ., with partial witness structures T, on Fi, i 30, with 
the following properties: let F, = (W,, vi) and S, 2 Wi such that 7; has no requirement 
at any w E S,, i30. 
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_ II< C W,,, and S, CS,,l. 
_ For all n’ E S,, v, lot.) = II;(W) and T-i 1 extends r, at M’. 
The construction proceeds inductively as follows: define Wo = W, v() = v and q, = T. 
Suppose that we are given T, on F, satisfying the inductive assumptions. If W, = S,, 
then set F,,, = Fi and T, + 1 = 7;; otherwise, among elements in IV; -S,, pick the least 
one in the enumeration, say 1~. By repeated applications of Proposition 16, we get r,’ 
on the finite universal frame F: = (W/, ~1:) where W, i W,‘, and for all w’ t S,, we 
have v:(w’) = v,(Jv’), for all IV” E (CV,’ - {w’}), VV’ &i ~((w”) and T,’ extends T, at M,‘. 
In particular, for all w’ E S,, 1~’ $Z v:(~v). 
Note that T: has a requirement at +V in F; as well. By Lemma 17, there exists a 
partial witness structure T’ on a finite universal frame F’ which has no requirements 
at w, and in addition, for all bv’ E S,, v’(~r’) = v~(w’) and T’ extends T,’ at VV’, as 
required. Set F,+I = F’ and T,, I = T’. 
Such a construction ensures the following property: for all +V E U, there exists n,,, 
such that for all k >/I,, , w t Wk, vi, (IV) = v,?,, (1~) and Tk extends T ,,,, at no. 
Now define the universal frame Fi ,,,, ‘?? (WI ,,,,. vllm) as follows: W,,,, = U, CV,, and 
\liim(~t~) = V,),,(W) for w E IVii,,. The tree pi,,,, = (@ii ,,,, --til ,,,. AI,,,) is defined in the 
obvious manner: the root is labelled WI,,, and for M: E WI,,,,, it has a subtree isomorphic 
to z,,,, It can be checked that ril,,, is a view tree on Fli,,,. 
For any node 0 E Oiim, and u E Ali,,,( if 0 is the root, then ~,,,,(H,u) = T,(OO,~,U), 
where i is the least index such that u E W; and 0 o., is the root in 7;. Otherwise, 
t1 E Oi,,,, [XJ for some IV t W,i,,,. Define Ti,,,(U,u) = T,Jfl,u). 
It can be easily checked that T I,,,, is a complete witness structure on the frame Fli,,,, 
as required. 
Lemmas 14, 15 and 18 togther show that a formula is satisfiable iff it has a partial 
witness structure. 
Theorem 19. The sati.$abilit~~ qf rr,fi~vn?uka u MYI be decided in nondeterministic time 
2G)(11ic122, where m is the length qf’ x and d = ,H( x). 
Proof. Fix the formula x0 of length m whose satisfiability is to be decided. There 
are at most 2(‘(“‘) atoms. Given a k-element set S, constructing a tree labelled by 
decreasing subsets of S, assigning an atom to each element in each node, checking 
that the structure is a view tree and that it gives a partial witness structure can be 
done by a nondeterministic Turing machine in time k”+ ‘. By Lemmas 14, 15 and 18, 
we know that ~0 is satisfiable iff there is a partial witness structure for it over a set 
whose size is at most 2o(““‘). Thus, a nondeterministic machine can decide satisfiability 
of Q in time 2001’) + (2o(‘T”/))‘f+i, which is time 2oCrflc/‘), 
We have thus shown that the satisfiability and model checking problems for the logic 
are elementarily decidable. Moreover, note that the complexity of model checking is 
linear in the size of the formula, and if we confine our attention to formulas of bounded 
alternation depth, then it is also polynomial in the size of the model. 
4. Monotone frames 
In an example discussed earlier, we considered a frame where $t’() - 1z.1 -. 11.2 where 
I’( IV(~) = { II’(~. 1~1 } and ~(1~1 ) = {IVI, “‘2 }_ We might see this as the agent ‘forgetting’ 
the information about )I‘[~ at 1~1; for instance, this may be a case of reusing memory 
to compute the state bc‘n. We now consider the subclass of frames where this cannot 
happen, and in which visibility preserves logical indistinguishability. 
Definition 20. A view frame F = (W. --. v) is said to be /~onotorze if and only if It 
is weakly recognizable, and V~V, I~‘~,Iv~ E W, if {~~~,, v!‘:} C ~($1,) and ~1‘~ - ~'2 then 
I,(u,) f-7 \‘()v, :I = V(W) n V(W). 
In monotone frames, once two logically indistinguishable worlds become visible 
from another, they both contain the same information, in the sense that at )t, the agent 
considers the same world to be visible at it’s as at 1~~. The following properties of 
view functions in monotone frames make this clearer. 
Proof. Assume that bL*? E Y(WI ) and ~‘1 - 11’2. By weak recognizability, $(‘I t v(M.; ). 
By definition of monotonicity, since (1~~. \I’? j C Y(IL.~ ) and M‘I - II’:, WC get V( lz.1 ) = 
1st 1~‘~ ) fl v( IL‘; ), that is, \‘(~‘1) C V(IC, ). But then ~1‘1 t Y()c> ) as well, and again by weak 
recognizability, II’? E V(M). Now we have {IC,.M} z v(\c;) and as before we find that 
\m(ns2) C V( ~‘1 ). Thus, ~(br, ) = ~(bt’,), establishing the first statement. The definition of 
monotonicity and the hypotheses of (ii) together imply that \I’] E $11’:) and \t*: t V(I~‘I ). 
and the claim follows from (i). 
Proposition 22. /f’ F = (IV, N, 1’) is LI wwwtone fwnw and W’ & W, then so 0i.w is 
F’ICY’. 
WC say z is monotone satisfiable if there exists a model M = (F. V), where F = 
( PI: -2, V) is a monotone frame and for some M, t IV’, we have M, 11’ + a. A formula is 
monotone valid if and only if its negation is not monotone satisfiable. 
Note that the implication XL% I: LXcn is monotone valid, though not valid. To see 
this, suppose M, cl' k XLc( in a monotone model M. Then, LV t \N(n,) and M [v(bv). n‘ i 
Lr. Let 11’ E V( IV) and IV N it.’ such that M [v(vv), 111’ + x. By proposition above. 
I’( 1~) = ~(+ts’) and hence we have M [v(%t“ ), IV' L_ x. That is, M, It,’ + Xx. Since 
IV - IV’, WC get M, w + Lxx, as required. 
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4. I. Checking truth 
The advantage of monotone frames is clearly seen by the implications of Proposition 
21: consider a universal monotone frame F = ( W, v), and note that v partitions W into 
sets WI, W2,..., etc., such that a world in W, is visible from a world in Wi iff i = j. 
Thus, the frame is split into a set of universal subframes. Further, observe that for 
every formula x and VV,+V’ E W such that VV’ E v(~v), since v(w) = v(Iv’), 
Thus, given a frame with k worlds in it, there are at most k + 1 substructures which 
we need to work with when we wish to check truth. The benefits bestowed by these 
observations are immediate: 
Theorem 23. The monotone truth checking problem is solvable in time O(nk), where 
k is the size of the given structure and H is the length oj. the checked jbrmula. 
Proof. Suppose that we are given a monotone model M = (( W, N, v), V ), an element 
wa E W and a formula a~. We confine our attention to the universal submodel defined 
by [WO] = { wa, WI,. . . , IV_ I}, say. Since M is monotone, v partitions [IQ]. Assume that 
there is an enumeration of W listing the partitions contiguously, so that for 0 <j Gk, 
there exist jr, j? such that j, d j d j2 and {wi, , . , uljz} is one of the partitions induced 
by V. Fix an enumeration of SF in order of non-decreasing length. 
We label each world MI E W by an ordered pair (Lr , Lz), both subsets of SF. Initially, 
for all IV, set w.L, = w.Lz = V(w) n SF. We now describe the labelling procedure for 
all M’,.L~, 0 <j <k, where we consider pairs of the form (y, IL.,) in the lexicographic 
order defined by the enumeration of SF and W fixed above: 
- Add ~CI to wi.Lz only if CI # w,.L2. 
- Add c( V /I to w,.Ll only if c( E I.L’,.L? or ,4 E bc,.L2. 
- Add Xr to wi.L2 only if a E w,.L2. 
- Add Ka to wI.Lz only if CI E w,.L> for all i: j, < i < j2. 
The labelling procedure for wi,LI, 06 j< k, is similar: the only changes are: 
- Add XE to wi.Ll only if C( E wi.Ll. 
- Add Ka to wi.LI only if c( E w;.Li for all i: O<i<k. 
Finally, terminate saying ‘Yes’ if CQ E wo.L, and ‘No’, otherwise. 
It is easy to check that for all r E SF and NJ E W, M, w /= a iff CI E w.L,, and 
for )V E v(w), M[v(*v), w /= cx iff x E w.L2. Hence, the algorithm is correct and runs 
in time O(nk) where k is the size of the given structure and n is the length of the 
checked formula. 
4.2. SatiFjiability 
For proving decidability of the monotone satisfiability problem, we can again define 
witness structures and show that a formula is monotone satisfiable iff it has a witness 
structure. But the structures required are very simple now. 
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Fix a formula an, and let AT be the set of subsets of #(x0) which are atoms. A 
monotone witness structure for SIO is a set of pairs f = (A. B) E (AT x AT) satisfying 
the following conditions: 
(i) For some (Ao, B(j) in r, CQ E Au. 
(ii) If Lx E A, there exists (A’,B’) E f such that A - il’ and x t A’. 
(iii) If X7’~ue t A, then 
(a) A f‘ P = B n P. 
(b) B < B <A. 
(c) If Lc t B, there exists (A’, B’) E r such that B - B’ and x E B’. 
Given such a witness structure for ao, it is easy to construct a model M for ~(1 as 
follows: A4 = (( w, -. v), V), where W = r; (A,B) w (A’.B’) iff A -A’: if XTrue E A. 
then $(A, B)) ‘2 {(A’,B’)jB - B’}, and \‘((A, B)) ‘2. 8, otherwise. V((A, B)) ‘g A f_iP. 
We can then check that for all CI E SF, M,(A,B) k x iff E E A, and when XTrue E A, 
bf[\q((A,B)),(A.B) k r iff x E B. This shows that M. (At). B(J) /== s[() and hence xo is 
satisfiable. 
On the other hand, given a model A4 = ((W, -, v). V) such that M,wo + C(O, con- 
structing a witness structure for ~(0 is also straightforward: for each world 1%’ form 
a pair (A,, . B,,.), where A,,. = (7 E SFIA4, w + ;t}; if ~1’ E v(K,), then B,, = { ;’ E 
SF~M[\I(W),W + y} and B,, = 8 otherwise. 
Let III = (cq /. There exists W’ &[no] such that / W’I < m, ~‘0 E W’, and for every 
1%’ E W’ and L/l E SF, if M,M, k L/Ii, then there exists +v’ E W’ such that M,bt’ /== /j. 
Call this a good subset of [HIO]. For each VI’ E ( PV’I~V(~)), let g(w) denote a good subset 
of V(PI.) containing vv similarly, and of size at most m. Let IV” = FV’ U U,, c,c., y( tt’). 
We can then show that I‘ = {(A,, , B,, ) 111‘ E W”} is a monotone witness stnicturc 
for q). 
Thus, x is monotone satisfiable iff there is a monotone witness structure for x of 
size 0( 1x1’). On the other hand, a monotone witness structure of size k for x gives a 
model of size k for x as well. Therefore, we have: 
Lemma 24. CI is monotone sutisfiuhle #‘it is s~~tisfiahle in a monotone model qf si:cJ 
OW). 
This lemma, alongwith the model checking procedure above, at once gives an NP 
decision procedure for monotone satisfiability. 
Theorem 25. The monotone sati@abilit~, problem is NP-complete. 
4.3. Axiom system 
We now present an axiomatization of monotone valid formulas. We present it in 
two layers in a mutually recursive manner, one layer for explicitly valid formulas, 
and another for monotone valid formulas. We use the notation E.y to denote formulas 
proved as theorems in the system for explicit validity and i- for the theorems of the 
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system for monotone validity. However, we will have rules for ‘transferring’ theorems 
from one system to the other, so we are always, in effect, speaking of the combined 
system. 
Ax/L,, The axiom q’stem jtir monotone valid .fbrmulus: 
(AO) All the substitutional instances of the tautologies of PC 
(Al) K(a 3 /?) 3 (Kcc 3 K/i') 
(A2) Y(r > p) > (Ya > Y/?) 
(A3) Kcc > ci 
(A4) Ka > KKu 
(A5)7Ka > KlKx 
(A6) XTrue I (x s Xcc) when ,u(X~)= ,u(z) 
(A7) Xa 1 YE 
(AS) XLa > LXc( 
Injkrence rules: 
(A@‘;) a, c1 3 /3 (KG) c( (XG) k.u u 
P KC! YCC 
Axx, The axiom system for explicitly valid,formulus: 
(BO) M c Xa 
Injkrence rules: 
(MP,Y) ct. LY 3 B (ZE) t- CI 
P s( 
A derivation of the combined system is a finite sequence of formulas where each 
line is of the form: 
- F c( where c( is an axiom of A.\-.,, or follows from formulas earlier in the sequence 
by an application of a rule of ,4x,$,, or 
- b,y x where c( is an axiom of Ax.u or follows from formulas earlier in the sequence 
by an application of a rule of A.x,y. 
A thesis or theorem of the combined system is a formula that occurs as the last line 
of a derivation. When it is of the form i- x (tx x), we refer to it as a theorem of AX!M 
(A-w ). 
The axiom schemes carry no surprises: schemes (Al ) and (A2) are deductive closure 
axioms for the two modalities. Schemes (A3) through (A5) are the usual properties 
of the K operator. (A6) asserts Proposition 8, whereas (A7) asserts that the visible 
substructure is unique. (A8) is the characteristic axiom for monotonicity, specifying 
that v partitions every --equivalence class further. (BO) is the only crucial difference 
between the two systems, as it is not valid, but explicitly valid. 
Note that every theorem of Ax,~ is also a theorem of Axu. This allows us, for 
instance, to derive tautologies as theorems of Ax, due to rule (IE), and ‘X-versions’ 
of tautologies owing to rule (XC). 
The following are some sample theses and derived rules of the combined system. 
The derivations are easy and hence omitted. 
(TI) I- (Yx /\ X/Q > X(x ,r, p) 
(T2) t XY E XXc( 
(T3) t Xx z XYr 
(TA) tm \‘r _. YXz 
(T5) TV li’;x E YYz 
(T6) E, K:! t( 
(KG\- ) t \ J 
t, Kz 
As usual. we say a formula 2 is con.sistmt if its negation is not a thehis of the 
combined system. Specifically, if y -TX, we call Y A.\-,i,-consistent, and if‘ ~‘1 ‘1. 
WC‘ call 2 /I.\-\ -consistent. Clearly, every Ax \ -consistent formula is .4.x-li-consistcnt 
due :o rule (II!). and whenever Xr is ds,,-consistent. x IS A.\-\ -consistent. thanks to 
rule (XG ). 
A finite set of formulas A is conslstcnt ifT the conjunction of all formulas In IL 
(denoted ‘-1) is consistent. We assume that 8 = Fu1.w by convention. A set of formulai 
I‘ is consistent iff every finite subset of I‘ is consistent. We will bc intcrestcd in set, 
of 14.t-\l-consistent formulas as well as sets of A.u\ -consistent formulas. Since every set 
of the latter type is also one of the former type, when WC simply speak of consistent 
sets, we mean A.Y,i,-consistent sets. 
A set .x1 is said to be Musi~?zul Comistrr~t. if ,b+,henevc-r there is a formula 7 ~ch 
that .-1 ci {3) IS consistent, then Y E A, 
Proof. Soundness is straightforward, and we have already shown the \,aliditl of (AX 1. 
the characteristic axiom for monotonicity. To pro\~ completcncss, WC she\\ that every 
:,I.\-,, -consistent formula is monotone satisfiable. (Strictly. we should simuitancorrsly 
show that every Ax\ -consistent formula is explicitly satisfiable as well; but SUCII a 
proof is easy to carry out on the same lines, and writing it explicitly only makcq the 
presentation tedious, so we omit it.) 
Fix an A.r\f-consistent formula cq and let SF denote the set SE‘,,,. Let .MJT dcnotc 
the set of all maximal A.r,,,-consistent subsets 01’ SF and let XAT denote the set of 
all maximal &v-consistent subsets of SF. Clearly, there exists .4,, t: MilT such that 
I(, E 140. 
Define izl = ((IV, -, v). V) as follows: FY = {(J,B)lil t M.4T such that (XTQR’ ;f .I 
and B = o? ) or (XTrue E A and A A XE is A.\-l,-consistent)}. We use 1~. 1~’ etc to range 
over IV and refer to the first and second components respectively by \t’.l and ~\..7. 
(Note that ~1’~) = (Ao,Bo) E W, where CQ) t &.) +_ is defined by II’ r~ 11.’ iff Kr: II .I 
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iff Kz E w’.l. v(w) ‘zf {w’lw’.2 # 8, and Ka E w.2 iff Ka E w/.2}. V(w) def w.1 n P. 
It is easy to check that A4 is a monotone model. 
The following series of observations shows how the pairs of atoms in W are related, 
and how pairs relate to other pairs in W. We omit some details, but these are standard 
in the study of modal logics, and can be found in texts like [7]. 
Proposition 27. (i) For any A E x4T, Xcc E A ifs M E A. 
(ii) If A E MAT such that XTrue E A, then there exists B E _&IT such that 
(A,B) E W. 
Proof. The first assertion follows from axiom (BO). To prove the second, assume that 
XTrue E A, and note that FX True G (gV...Vz), whereXAT = {B,,...,Bk}. Hence 
t-,v XTrue E X(B*;V . V K). Hence, A^ A X(B*; V . . V z) is AxM-consistent; therefore, 
for some j, A^ A m; is AxM-consistent. By definition of W, (A, B) E W, as required. 
Proposition 28. Let w E W be of the form (A, B). 
(i) If Xa E A then a E B. 
(ii) If La E A then there exists (A’,B’) N (A, B) such that CI E A’. 
Proof. Consider the first assertion: since A^ A fi is AxM-consistent, and Xa E A, we 
can use thesis (T7) to show that X(g A a) is AxM-consistent, and by rule (XG), we 
have that g A CI is Axx-consistent. But B E XAT, hence a E B, as required. 
To prove the second assertion, suppose that Lcr E A. Define the set r = {KPIKP E 
A} u {LyJLy E A} U {x}. We can use axioms (Al) and (A3) through (A5) to show 
that this set is Ax,,!-consistent. Hence there exists A’ E MAT such that r 2 A’. If 
XTrue E A’, by Proposition 27 above, there exists B’ E mT such that (A’,B’) E W. 
Otherwise, set B’ = 0, and again (A’, B’) E W. By definition of -, (A,B) N (A’, B’), 
and by construction, a E A’. 
Proposition 29. Let w E W be of the form (A, B), and let XTrue E A. 
(i) AnP = BnP. 
(ii) If La E B then there exists (A’,B’) E v((A,B)) such that a E B’. 
Proof. The first assertion follows immediately from axiom (A6). Now suppose La E B. 
Let r dAf {K/?lKp E B} U {LylLy E B} U {a}. It is easy to show that tx g 1 L?, 
and from this, that k (A^ A 6) 1 XL?. This implies, by axiom (A8), that A^ A LX? is 
AxM-consistent. We can now show, along the lines of Proposition 28, that there exists 
(A’, B’) E W such that (A, B) - (A’, B’), and A^I A X@ A X? is AxM-consistent. Using 
thesis (T7) and (XG), we get that @A? is Axx-consistent. But B’ EXAT, hence r C B. 
Therefore (A’, B’) E v((A, B)) and G( E B’, as required. 
We now have all the ingredients to establish the following claim inductively. For 
every w = (A,B) E W, for all y E SF, 
- IlEA iffM.wky, and 
~ If vv E V(W), y E B iff M[v(w),~: + 7. 
Now, since ~0 E -40, where vvo = (&Bo), we have A4.1q~ + ‘ql and we have a 
monotone model for c(~. 
5. Discussion 
We have argued that the distinction between logical distinguishability and visibil- 
ity is one worth making and attempted to demonstrate that a logic of knowledge 
bearing such features is technically interesting. While this distinction has the sort 
of philosophical motivation presented in Section 1, there is also a more pragamatic 
reason for considering it, and that has to do with the way we model systems. One 
important reason for studying knowledge in the context of computing agents is that 
the agents’ uctions at any instant of time are based on the knowledge at that time. 
This interplay of knowledge, time and action is a major theme in the literature on 
knowledge in distributed systems (see (21 and [l]). However, knowledge based ac- 
tion must involve computed knowledge and it is here that we feel that the distinction 
made above is crucial, as the agent being resource limited, may have only limited 
visibility. 
To study this, we need to enrich the frames to include time and action. Further, 
we have only talked about one reasoner so far, and this needs to be generalized to 
systems of many reasoners. We believe that the class of Knowledge Transition Systems 
introduced in [9], [16], augmented with view functions provide a suitable framework 
for such a study. Correspondingly, the logic would also need to be enriched with 
modalities talking about reachability. The advantage of such a set-up is that resource 
limitations can be modelled in a natural way: for instance, we can consider systems 
where views are uniformly bounded to have at most k states; or insist that only the 
adjacent states (in the transition system graph) be visible at any state. We can then 
study interactions between agents one of whom does a one-step-look-ahead whereas 
the other always looks ahead two steps, and so on. This suggests that a dynamics or 
temporal logic of view-based knowledge may be worth studying. 
An important issue that we have not satisfactorily addressed here is the precise 
epistemic status of the X modality. We have already observed that it is by itself nei- 
ther like a knowledge modality nor a belief modality, in the sense originally discussed 
by Hintikka [S]. Since our logic has both the standard knowledge modality and this 
one, it is similar to logics where agents reason about knowledge of beliefs and so on. 
like in [lo] and [ 111. However, much of the complexity of the logic in [ 101 arises 
from systems of many reasoners, which we have not studied here. [I I] reduces belief 
to a form of knowledge, whereas in our framework, belief comes in as an extra-logical 
notion in the form of views. The closest relationship to theories of belief seems to 
be in the fact that beliefs are based on evidence, and views can perhaps be seen as 
providing such evidence. 
We have studied frames where the visibility of states is dependent on the world 
state. At the other end, we can think of static frames, where there is a fixed subset 
W’ C: W such that V’w, V(W) = W’ is constant. But then we do not need the X modality; 
a special proposition z which when asserted at M’ means that IV E W’, would do the 
job. Construction of a meaning-preserving map from Y to @: (when interpreted over 
static frames) is a straightforward exercise. 
For the basic logic of view-based explicit knowledge, we have only shown decidabil- 
ity here, and a complete axiom system has been given only for the monotone subclass 
of frames. In the general case, the following axiom is sound: 
(G) XLa I Lx (a boolean) 
We believe that a model construction can be carried out for consistent formulas of 
this system (where (A8) is replaced by (G)), along the lines of the construction in 
the proof of Theorem 19. However, the details seem tricky, and this is left for future 
work. 
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